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WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW 
Volume 41 2019 Issue 1 
TORT LAW—THE WRONGFUL DEMISE OF BUT FOR 
CAUSATION 
Tory A. Weigand* 
The observation by Professor Dobbs that “[t]he substantial factor test is 
not so much a test as an incantation”1 remains compelling.  The 
continued and widespread use of “substantial factor” in lieu of “but for” 
as the predominate means of defining causation in any multiple 
defendant or multiple cause case is troubling.  “Substantial factor” was 
never intended to supplant “but for” in such cases.  This overuse and 
misunderstanding, which is otherwise accentuated by the Third 
Restatement’s causal set notion, poses the significant risk that causation 
can be found when the defendant’s conduct is neither a “but for” nor 
sufficient cause of the harm or injury.  The result is an unacceptable 
dilution of the requisite nexus for legal responsibility.  This Article 
inspects the origin and sources of substantial factor causation in 
Massachusetts jurisprudence as well as the approach advocated for by 
the Third Restatement, both informing and demonstrating the need for 
greater understanding and restraint as to the otherwise wholesale 
substitution of “substantial factor” for “but for” in multiple cause or 
multiple defendant cases. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since “the mists of time,” the sine qua non of factual causation has 
been “but for.”2  Despite its primacy and root in individual responsibility, 
but for causation has been under strain due to the perceived difficulties 
posed by cases involving multiple potential causes.  The substantial factor 
 
* Tory A. Weigand is a partner with Morrison Mahoney, LLP. 
1. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 416 (2000). 
2. John D. Rue, Returning to the Roots of the Bramble Bush: The “But For” Test Regains 
Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Institute’s Proposed Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2684 (2003). 
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language emerged as a salve with courts and litigants, increasingly 
resorting to, or arguing, that the substantial factor test is an improvement 
or necessary substitute for the but for test in any multiple causation case.  
The use of substantial factor causation has now become commonplace.  It 
can be found in both the factual and proximate cause constituents and 
appears poised to become the predominate means of defining causation.3 
The ascendancy of substantial factor causation and the corresponding 
perceived or actual demise of but for causation in any multiple cause case 
is troubling.4  Such use is inconsistent with the humble origins of 
“substantial factor” threatens to impermissibly dilute the requisite degree 
of causal nexus imperative for imposition of responsibility.5  
Compounding the picture is the advent of the Third Restatement of Torts 
(Third Restatement) which, while reasserting the primacy of “but for,” 
purges substantial factor terminology from causation parlance altogether 
 
3. See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 842–44 (Mass. 2008); O’Connor 
v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 510, 511–12 (Mass. 1988); see Wright v. Reithoffer Shows, 
Inc., No. 15-P-1644, 2016 WL 6188540, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 24, 2016) (noting verdict 
based on conduct “not a substantial contributing cause” with no reference to “but for”); Supeno 
v. Equity Office Props. Mgmt., LLC, 874 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (“In tort law, 
the test for causation is whether the ‘defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing 
about injury . . . .’” (quoting Bernier v. Bos. Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391, 400 (Mass. 1980))); 
Boucher v. Lowell Automatic Transmission, No. 9722, 2001 WL 920693, at *3 (Mass. App. 
Div. Aug. 8, 2001) (“In a negligence case, it is sufficient to use the phrase ‘substantial factor’ 
when giving an instruction on proximate cause.”); see also Bonoldi v. DJP Hosp., Inc., No. 15–
P–780, 2016 WL 4577493, at *1 (Mass. Sept. 2, 2016) (affirming substantial contributing cause 
instruction); Klairmont v. Gainsboro Rest., Inc., 987 N.E.2d 1247, 1263–65 n.26 (Mass. 2013) 
(same); Wess v. Butterworth, No. 14–P–1790, 2016 WL 3474846, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. June 
27, 2016) (same); Peters v. Shaws Supermarkets, Inc., No. 15–P–1304, 2016 WL 3460633, at 
*2–3 (Mass. App. Ct. June 24, 2016) (same); Hannon v. Calleva, No. 14–P–1061, 2015 WL 
4079832, at *1–2 (Mass. App. Ct. July 7, 2015) (same); Hixon v. Glynn, No. 14–P–498, 2015 
WL 1311680, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Mar. 25, 2015) (same); C.A.I., Inc. v. Bos. Gas Co., No. 
12–P–1893, 2014 WL 73377, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 10, 2014) (same); Hoa Ho v. Hodin, 
No. 11–P–1628, 2013 WL 1314522, at *2–3 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 3, 2013) (same); Miyazaki 
v. Works, No. 11–P–2176, 2012 WL 6049083, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 6, 2012) (same); 
Murphy v. Consalvi, No. 11–P–1665, 2012 WL 3481699, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 16, 2012) 
(same); Pitts v. Wingate at Brighton, Inc., 972 N.E.2d 74, 80 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012) (same); 
Edson v. Richter, No. 09–P–905, 2010 WL 1329032, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 7, 2010) 
(same); Mastaby v. Cent. Hosp., Inc., 613 N.E.2d 123, 124 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
4. See Anthony J. Sebok, Actual Causation in the Second and Third Restatement: Or, the 
Expulsion of the Substantial Factor Test, in CAUSATION IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW 60, 63 (Marta 
Infantino & Eleni Zervogianni eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) (“It is important to recognize 
what ‘substantial factor’ was not intended to do.  It was not intended to form an alternative to 
the well-known ‘but-for’ test for causation.”). 
5. Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 407, 430 (1987) 
(“For tort law wrongfulness without causation is empty; causation without wrongfulness is 
blind.”). 
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and adopts the expansive “causal set” mode imposing liability for 
otherwise insufficient causes.6 
This Article examines factual causation in Massachusetts, including 
the origin and use of the but for test and the substantial factor exception, 
as well as their treatment under the various Restatements.  It reviews three 
primary sources relied upon for the suggestion that “but for” is no longer 
necessary in any multiple defendant or multiple cause action.  The article 
questions whether these sources provide a viable basis to supplant “but 
for” with “substantial factor” and explores the arguments for and against 
the continued use of substantial factor causation in jury instructions, 
including its treatment under the Restatement. 
I. CAUSE IN FACT AND “BUT FOR” 
Massachusetts refers to factual cause as “cause in fact” or “actual 
causation.”7  It requires that a cause-and-effect relationship or actual 
connection be established between the wrongful act and the asserted 
harm.8  Factual cause is “empirically ascertainable” and grounded in the 
facts of the case.9 
Factual cause is distinct from proximate or legal cause because “[t]he 
law does not impose liability for all harm factually caused by tortious 
conduct.”10  Proximate cause thus presupposes the existence of factual 
cause and addresses the issue of whether in fairness, pragmatic judgment, 
and as a matter of social policy, the defendant should be held responsible, 
or legally accountable, for the harm or injury claimed.  Proximate cause 
is a limiting principle serving to confine a wrongdoer’s responsibility for 
 
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (recognizing trivially insufficient but necessary to a sufficient set 
as factual causes). 
7. See, e.g., Kent v. Commonwealth, 771 N.E.2d 770, 777 (Mass. 2002) (utilizing “cause 
in fact”); Ulwick v. DeChristopher, 582 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Mass. 1991) (“[T]he plaintiff has the 
burden of proving each and every element of that claim: duty, breach of duty (or, the element 
of negligence), causation (actual and proximate) and damages.”); Wiska v. St. Stanislaus Social 
Club, Inc., 390 N.E.2d 1133, 1136–37 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (utilizing “actual causation” for 
cause in fact); see also, H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 90 (2d ed. 
1985) (explaining that causation is comprised of actual causation, or cause in fact, and proximate 
cause). 
8. David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1680 
(2007) (“Before negligence law assigns responsibility to a defendant for a plaintiff’s harm, it 
demands that the plaintiff establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the negligence and 
the harm.”). 
9. See Rue, supra note 2, at 2679–80. 
10. Leavitt v. Brockton Hosp., Inc., 907 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Mass. 2009); see HART & 
HONORÉ, supra note 7. 
 
4 - WEIGAND. PUBLISHER READY. 2.19.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  10:38 PM 
78 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:75 
factually caused harm to foreseeable risks, or those risks fairly emanating 
from the asserted wrong as opposed to those that may arise remotely.11  
The definition or scope of proximate cause (or foreseeable result) is, in 
turn, “based on considerations of policy and pragmatic judgment.”12 
The but for test is the classic and necessary inquiry for factual 
causation: the defendant’s conduct was a cause of the plaintiff’s harm if 
the harm would not have occurred absent the defendant’s negligence—
i.e., without which the harm would not have occurred.13  An action is not 
a but for cause of an injury if the injury would have come about regardless 
of the action.14  Factual or but for causation requires a “counterfactual 
inquiry.”15  It requires identification of the asserted injury and wrongful 
conduct and poses the question that if the wrongful conduct had not taken 
place whether the injury would have occurred.16  “[T]he answers [to the 
but for inquiry] are characterized as opinion rather than certain knowledge 
because the but-for question is always asking about what would have 
happened had things been different than they in fact were.”17 
 
11. See Kent, 771 N.E.2d at 777. 
12. Poskus v. Lombardo’s of Randolph, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Mass. 1996); see also 
Glick v. Prince Italian Foods of Saugus, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 100, 102 (Mass. 1987) (“Proximate 
cause does not require the particular act which caused the injury to have been foreseen, only 
that the general character and probability of the injury be foreseeable.” (citing Carey v. New 
Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 245 N.E.2d. 420, 423 (Mass. 1969))); Young v. Atl. Richfield Co., 
512 N.E.2d 272, 275 (Mass. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (holding the defendant’s 
breach of duty must “create a risk of the species which was causally related to the result which 
occurred”). 
13. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 366, 
at 265 (5th ed. 1984) (“An act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular 
event would have occurred without it.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Conduct is a factual cause of 
harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”). 
14. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 366, at 265–66. 
15. See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 
1770 n.21 (1997) [hereinafter Common Sense]. 
16. See id. at 1768–73. 
17. Id. at 1769.  Robertson explains that under the but for analysis, “the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct is now ‘corrected’ to the minimal extent necessary to make it conform to the 
law’s requirements.”  Id. at 1770.  Consistent with the “more probable than not” burden of proof, 
a claimant bears the burden of showing “that there was greater likelihood or probability that the 
harm complained of was due to causes for which the defendant was responsible than from any 
other cause.”  Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 338–39 (Mass. 1983) (quoting 
Carey v. Gen. Motors Corp., 387 N.E.2d 583, 587 (Mass. 1979)).  Similarly, “plaintiffs are not 
required to eliminate entirely all possibility that the defendant’s conduct was not a cause.  It is 
enough that they introduce evidence from which reasonable men may conclude that it is more 
probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that it was not.”  Carey, 387 N.E.2d at 
585–86 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1965)); see 
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The but for test is not without its critics.18  To some, asking the 
counterfactual question “take[s] the eye off the ball” in that “it focuses the 
jury’s attention on speculation about what might have happened rather 
than on the cause in fact problem of ‘what happened.’”19  Similarly, it is 
argued that “counterfactual causation is an incomplete theory.”20  The test 
is deemed over-inclusive insofar as it finds necessary background 
conditions as causes and can likewise “underrepresent our intuitive 
notions of causal relationships.”21  The relied upon atypical scenarios have 
been referenced as “corner” cases which, to some, cannot be reconciled 
with the but for test and “raise fundamental analytical objections.”22 
Despite any shortcoming, the best test for factual causation yet 
devised is “but for.”23  Court adjudications of disputes are typically after 
the fact and thereby necessitate both a retrospective view and the inherent 
“what if” question.  The counterfactual inquiry is not conceptually 
 
also Miles v. Edward O. Tabor, M.D., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (Mass. 1982); Zezuski v. 
Jenny Mfg. Co., 293 N.E.2d 875, 878–79 (Mass. 1973). 
18. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. 
REV. 543, 556–57 (1962) (contending that the but for test “take[s] the eye off the ball”); Note, 
Rethinking Actual Causation in Tort Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2163, 2164–66 (2017) 
[hereinafter Rethinking Actual Causation] (advocating for departure from acceptance of the but 
for test as to actual causation); E. Wayne Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case 
to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEX. L. REV. 423, 430–31 (1968) (arguing the use of a but for 
hypothetical is a faulty means of determining whether the conduct caused harm). 
19. Green, supra note 18, at 156; Thode, supra note 18, at 431; see Leon Green, Are There 
Dependable Rules of Causation?, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 605 (1929) (finding that “but for” is 
problematic because it requires speculating about what would have happened).  The use of the 
but for counterfactual hypothetical, as it is argued, fails to “prob[e] the relationship between the 
conduct and the injury[,]” but rather “considers the injury in isolation from the conduct.”  Ernest 
J. Weinrib, A Step Forward in Factual Causation, 38 MOD. L. REV. 518, 521–22 (1975) 
[hereinafter A Step Forward] (explaining that the but for test can only “operate as a [test] . . . of 
inclusion not of exclusion”); see also Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1735, 1774 (1985) (advocating Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set test (or NESS test) 
for causation).  Professor Wright’s NESS test is a substitute test for actual causation.  It provides 
that “a particular condition was a cause of (condition contributing to) a specific consequence if 
and only if it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient 
for the occurrence of the consequence.”  Wright, supra, at 1790 (emphasis omitted). 
20. John Morris, Dirty Harriet: The Restatement (Third) of Torts and the Causal 
Relevance of Intent, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1685, 1687 (2014) [hereinafter Dirty Harriet]; Rethinking 
Actual Causation, supra note 18, at 2166 (“[I]n cases of overdetermination and preemption, the 
but-for conception denies causal status to actions that appear intuitively causal.”). 
21. Dirty Harriet, supra note 20. 
22. Rethinking Actual Causation, supra note 18, at 2168.  Examples of such “corner” 
cases include asbestos, pollution, terrorist financiers, and child pornography.  Dirty Harriet, 
supra note 20, at 1692–1708. 
23. Rue, supra note 2, at 2722 (“The ‘but for’ test is the worst mechanism to determine 
factual cause imaginable, except for all the others that have been tried so far.”). 
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difficult to apply, as “[e]veryone who moves about in the world 
successfully applies the but-for test countless times each day, usually 
without conscious thought.”24  The process of identifying the specific 
harm, determining the acts or omissions of each defendant, and applying 
the counterfactual inquiry as to each works well in most cases, including 
those involving multiple defendants or causes, keeping in mind that a 
given harm may have more than one factual cause.  Furthermore, the more 
difficult “corner” cases can be approached through notions of concerted 
or concurrent activity.  To the extent there is ever deemed a need, given 
unusual circumstances, to implement a less demanding standard, it must 
be confined to identifiable, rigorous, and principled criteria. 
At its core, the importance of but for causation lies in individual 
responsibility.  There is no moral or social policy justifying imposition of 
liability where the wrongful conduct did not cause the harm or injury. 
[T]he security and well-being of those engaged in socially desirable 
activities are just as important as the security and well-being of those 
who are injured; and a loss ought not to be shifted from a victim unless 
he can establish that it was attributable to tortious conduct of the 
defendant.25 
“Insistence by the courts on the cause in fact requirement prevents the 
litigation from being transformed into a general comparative survey of the 
moral qualities and defects of the litigants.”26  It “is an all-or-nothing 
proposition. . . . [S]pecific conduct is either a cause in fact, or it is not,”27 
representing the very minimum, albeit necessary, nexus for legal 
responsibility.28  It is only when an act or omission results in harm that 
 
24. David W. Robertson, The Vocabulary of Negligence Law: Continuing Causation 
Confusion, 58 LA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997) [hereinafter The Vocabulary of Negligence Law]. 
25. Common Sense, supra note 15, at 1766 (alteration in original) (quoting Page Keeton, 
Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 SW. L.J. 1, 2 (1982)). 
26. A Step Forward, supra note 19, at 518. 
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
reporters’ note cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (quoting Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. 
Co., 15 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). 
28. See David W. Robertson, Causation in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Three 
Arguable Mistakes, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1007, 1008 (2009) [hereinafter Three Arguable 
Mistakes]. 
[T]he cause-in-fact requirement is the “linchpin” of the corrective-justice theory.  
Indeed, it has long been regarded as a truism that “a defendant should never be 
held liable to a plaintiff for a loss where it appears that his wrong did not contribute 
to it, and no policy or moral consideration can be strong enough to warrant the 
imposition of liability in such [a] case.” 
Id. (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent 
Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 947 (1935)). 
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would not have otherwise occurred—and only then—that legal liability 
can be imposed.29  “To abandon the but for test is to abandon the element 
of causation.”30 
II. SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR: ROOTS AND RESTATEMENT 
A. Professor Smith and Substantial Factor as Proximate Cause 
The substantial factor element of causation has early Massachusetts 
roots.  It is credited to have first emerged in a 1912 Harvard Law Review 
article by Jeremiah Smith,31 who took issue with the prevailing view that 
a tortfeasor was not liable for “improbable consequences,” contending that 
such non-liability was arbitrary.32  Smith rejected the notion that 
tortfeasors should be relieved of liability where the harmful consequence 
was not foreseeable.33  He, in turn, argued that the appropriate linchpin for 
causative liability was that “[the d]efendant’s tort must have been a 
substantial factor in producing the damage complained of.”34  Professor 
Smith’s reference to “substantial factor” was related to proximate cause, 
not cause in fact.35  He had no issue with the but for test for factual 
 
29. See Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual 
Baselines, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181, 1216–17 (2003). 
30. Hillel David et al., Proving Causation Where the But For Test is Unworkable, 30 
ADVOCATES’ Q. 216, 220 (2005). 
31. Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 303, 310 (1911); 
see Michael D. Green, The Intersection of Factual Causation and Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 671, 698 n.97 (2006). 
32. See Smith, supra note 31, at 304–05; see also Peter Zablotsky, Mixing Oil and Water: 
Reconciling the Substantial Factor and Result-Within-the-Risk Approaches to Proximate 
Cause, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1003, 1013–14 (2008) (discussing Professor Smith’s substantial 
factor approach to proximate cause). 
33. See Smith, supra note 31, at 316 n.41. 
34. Id. at 309.  As noted by Professor Zablotsky, Professor Smith did not advocate for the 
elimination of foreseeability but that: 
[F]oreseeability determined the extent of the duty owed, and that initial duty and 
resulting harm were substantially related if they were “of a like general character” 
or “related to the same persons or class of persons, and to the same subject matter,” 
or if the harm was brought about it [sic] the same general “mode” or “manner.” 
Zablotsky, supra note 32, at 1014 (footnotes omitted). 
35. See Smith, supra note 31, at 308–10; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. j. (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (explaining that 
Smith intended the substantial factor test “to address the problem of proximate cause, not factual 
cause”).  Professor Smith defined “substantial factor” as follows: 
“Substantial” is not here meant to be understood as expressing merely the idea of 
“actual,” as opposed to “nominal.”  It is meant to be understood as expressing the 
idea of “considerable” or “of some magnitude,” in antithesis to “trifling,” “slight,” 
“trivial” or “minute.”  This notion of “considerable” is the idea sometimes (though 
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causation, rather his concern centered on identifying a practical alternative 
to the foreseeability or probability tests used for proximate cause.36 
The initial emergence of “substantial factor” in the proximate cause 
prong is notable as there remains uncertainty over whether the substantial 
factor test is an aspect of factual or proximate cause, or both.37  This 
entanglement, although perhaps more academic than practical, impedes 
both the decoupling of the two distinct prongs and the search for clarity 
regarding causative nomenclature and instructions.38  As much as factual 
cause and proximate cause are believed or intended to separate the 
ascertainment of policy-free facts from application of value-laden policy, 
there is no such clean line with the use of “substantial factor.”  The 
purported screening out function of “substantial factor” as to some “but 
for” causes—on essentially evaluative grounds—creates ambiguity 
between factual and proximate cause.  Moreover, “whether a factor is 
substantial . . . is a mixed question of fact and law requiring a decision as 
to the applicability of a legal norm to a given state of facts.”39  In the end, 
a formidable argument can be made that “substantial factor” is more suited 
for the policy work of proximate cause than the factual work of actual 
causation.40 
B. “Twin Fires” and “Sufficient” Harm 
There is very little mention, or use, of the substantial factor test for 
causation in case law prior to the Restatement of the Law of Torts (First 
Restatement) in 1934.41  The 1920 “twin fires” decision of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court is the oft-cited case or precursor to substantial factor 
 
it may not be always) conveyed by the word “substantial” in the statement, that, in 
order to maintain an action for certain kinds of “nuisance,” the damage must be 
“substantial.” 
Smith, supra note 31, at 310 n.22. 
36. See Smith, supra note 31, at 325. 
37. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Cirilo v. Garcia, 115 F.3d 50, 54 n.6 (1st Cir. 1997) (Campbell, 
J., concurring) (noting disagreement over whether “substantial factor” is part of factual cause 
or proximate cause). 
38. See generally Rue, supra note 2, at 2714 (“[I]t is far from settled case law that the 
‘substantial factor’ doctrine is applicable only to factual, and not proximate cause.”). 
39. A Step Forward, supra note 19, at 532 (“Uncertainty as to the facts increases the scope 
that must be accorded to considerations of policy.”). 
40. See Rue, supra note 2, at 2715–16. 
41. See 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 20.6, at 180 (2d ed. 1986) 
(“This ‘test’ for limiting liability attracted no following in the courts, and only scant attention 
from commentators, until the Restatement of Torts adopted it.”).  Prior to the publishing of the 
First Restatement, Connecticut adopted Professor Smith’s substantial factor terminology.  See, 
e.g., Mahoney v. Beatman, 147 A. 762, 767 (Conn. 1929). 
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causation.42  In this case, the owner of property destroyed by a fire brought 
a negligence action against a railroad company, contending that a spark 
from a train caused a fire to smolder on his property, which later “flared 
up” and destroyed the property.43  The railroad proposed alternative 
explanations for the damage to the plaintiff’s property: other fires in the 
area that had been swept up by weather conditions caused the damage or 
the fire attributable to the railroad had been swallowed by either another 
fire or multiple fires before reaching the property.44  The court held that 
the applicable showing required a determination as to whether the 
defendant’s tortious fire was a material factor in the fire that ultimately 
destroyed the property.45  It remained the plaintiff’s burden to establish 
that the defendant’s fire would have otherwise been sufficient to have 
damaged the property even if it had not merged with the innocent fire or 
fires.46  That is, the defendant’s wrongful fire would have otherwise been 
a but for or necessary cause of the property damage absent the other fire.47 
This has since been described as the “combined forces,” 
“overdetermined,” or “multiple sufficient causes” scenario, wherein it is 
claimed that the but for test for causation fails.  That is, when two or more 
causes could have independently brought about the asserted harm, the but 
for test has been described as “inappropriate” insofar as it allows for a 
negligent defendant to escape liability.48  Under the test, but for the 
 
42. See generally Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 
45 (Minn. 1920), overruled in part on other grounds by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 
N.W. 519 (1921) (holding that the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s tortious fire was 
a material factor in destroying the plaintiff’s property). 
43. Id. at 46. 
44. See id.at 46–49. 
45. Id. at 46, 49.  The court refused to follow an earlier Wisconsin Supreme Court decision 
which held that the defendant could be found not liable where the defendant’s negligently started 
fire merged with a fire that was not the result of any wrongdoing.  See id. at 49. 
46. The court instructed the jury as follows: 
If you find that bog fire was set by defendant’s engine, and that some greater fire 
swept over it before it reached plaintiff’s land, then it will be for you to determine 
whether the bog fire was a material or substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s 
damage.  If it was, defendant was liable.  If it was not, defendant was not liable.  If 
the bog fire was set by one of defendant’s engines, and if one of defendant’s 
engines also set a fire or fires west of Kettle River, and those fires combined and 
burned over plaintiff’s property, then the defendant is liable. 
Id. at 46. 
47. Id. 
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 27 reporters’ note cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“There is near-universal recognition of the 
inappropriateness of the but-for standard for factual causation when multiple sufficient causes 
exist.”). 
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defendant’s negligence, the plaintiff would have still suffered the same 
damages because of the other causes.49  “Clearly, two culpable defendants 
should not both escape liability, merely on the basis of a rote incantation 
of the ‘but for’ [test] in combination with an assertion of another 
defendant’s tortious behavior.”50  The “material factor” or “substantial 
factor” notion thus arose to allow the finding of causation where any one 
of the possible causes would have been sufficient to cause the injury.51  
While the non-defendant combining cause cannot be a basis to excuse 
liability for lack of causation, each defendant’s negligence must still be 
independently sufficient and itself substantial.  As to the “twin fire” 
scenario, for example, the property damage would have occurred due to 
defendant’s fire leaving aside its merger with the other fire.  
Consequently, a fundamental attribute of the but for test is its requirement 
that causation be established by the sufficiency of each wrongdoer’s 
action or omission in relation to the resulting harm. 
C. Substantial Factor in the Second Restatement: Double Duty 
The First Restatement was published in 1934 with the Second 
Restatement  following in 1965.52  Influenced by Professor Smith’s article 
as well as the Anderson decision, substantial factor causation was set out 
as a fundamental concept.53  It was intended to serve two purposes: (1) 
address and recognize the “twin fire” or multiple sufficient causes 
scenario; and (2) distinguish between trivial and substantial but for 
causes.54 
The Second Restatement provides that an actor’s negligence is a 
“legal cause” of harm when it “is a substantial factor in bringing about the 
 
49. Id. § 27 cmt. a (“When an actor’s tortious conduct is such a cause, it nevertheless 
would not be a factual cause if factual causes were limited to the definition in § 26: even without 
that tortious conduct, the harm would still have occurred because of the competing cause.”). 
50. Rue, supra note 2, at 2706. 
51. See Carpenter, supra note 28, at 952 (“The question is not whether the other causes 
would have been sufficient without the defendant’s wrong, but whether the defendant’s wrong 
was actually a material factor in producing the injury.”). 
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1965); RESTATEMENT OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS (AM. LAW INST. 1934). 
53. The Second Restatement provides the following regarding legal cause: 
The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct 
is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law 
relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in which his negligence 
has resulted in the harm. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
reporters’ note cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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harm,” and there is otherwise no applicable “rule of law relieving the actor 
of liability.”55  It identifies the primacy of but for causation by providing 
that an actor’s negligence is not a substantial factor if the harm would have 
otherwise occurred.56  “In order to be a legal cause of another’s harm, it is 
not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been 
negligent. . . . but . . . . [t]he negligence must also be a substantial factor 
in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”57  Under the Second Restatement, 
a “substantial factor” is an additional requirement for purposes of 
causation and intended to provide insulation against unlimited liability.58 
The Second Restatement incorporates “substantial factor” into the 
“factual cause” definition for purposes of addressing the twin fire/multiple 
sufficient cause scenario.  Pursuant to section 432(2), “[i]f two forces are 
actively operating, one because of the actor’s negligence, the other not 
because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is sufficient to 
bring about harm to another, the actor’s negligence may be found to be a 
substantial factor in bringing it about.”59  There is no true substitution of 
but for causation with substantial factor causation in that each of the 
multiple causes (or “fires”) must still be found to be independently 
sufficient to have caused the harm.  “Sufficiency,” in turn, is not met 
where a force could have caused the harm but only if it would have in fact 
caused the harm.60 
 
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
56. Id. § 432. 
57. Id. § 431 cmt. a. 
58. See, e.g., Jorgensen v. Mass. Port Auth., 905 F.2d 515, 524 (1st Cir. 1990) (articulating 
that causation-in-fact in Massachusetts requires a showing that defendant’s conduct was both a 
but for cause and “‘substantial legal factor’ in bringing about the alleged harm”); see also Or v. 
Edwards, 818 N.E.2d 163, 171 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that factual cause requires a 
plaintiff to demonstrate that a defendant’s negligence “was as a matter of fact a substantial 
causative factor in bringing about the [harm]. . . . [and that t]he question can be recast in ‘but 
for’ terms without change in meaning or likely result”).  But see Komlodi v. Picciano, 89 A.3d 
1234, 1254 (N.J. 2014) (holding that “but for” and “substantial factor” are mutually exclusive); 
Garcia v. Windley, 164 P.3d 819, 823 (Idaho 2007) (same). 
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
60. June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1243 (10th Cir. 2009).  According to the 
Tenth Circuit in June: 
The use of the word sufficient in both Restatements does not mean that either of 
them would impose liability for conduct that is not a but-for cause if only the 
conduct could have caused the injury.  Rather, it is necessary for the plaintiff to 
show that the conduct (or the causal set of which it is a necessary part) would in 
fact have caused the injury.  As we all know, in the modern world of many 
hazardous substances, there may be many possible causes of a particular cancer.  
Each could be said to be sufficient to cause a specific person’s cancer.  But one 
who suffers that cancer does not have a cause of action based on each such 
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The Second Restatement also uses “substantial factor” in an effort to 
distinguish between all but for causes, particularly between the trivial or 
de minimis and the significant or substantial causes.61  Considerations 
include: the number and effect of other producing causes; whether the 
defendant created a “continuous and active” force operating at the time of 
the harm; and lapse of time.62  It is this definition of “substantial factor” 
that results in an inquiry arguably more appropriate for proximate cause 
than factual causation.63  The purpose of the inquiry is to excuse 
defendants whose conduct is a but for cause of harm when the effect of 
that conduct is so “insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of [it] 
as [a] cause[].”64  It arguably reflects a “policy [type] judgment that the 
causal role played by the defendant’s carelessness was [sufficiently 
insubstantial] as to make it unfair to assign any responsibility to him.”65  
The Second Restatement, however, did not intend that the substantial 
factor test serve as a substitute for but for cause.66  The purpose of 
“‘substantial factor’ was meant to narrow the class of but-for [or 
 
substance to which he was exposed, regardless of how unlikely it is that the cancer 
resulted from that exposure.  Only a substance that would have actually (that is, 
probably) caused the cancer can be a factual cause without being a but-for 
cause. . . . It is not enough that the drug could have caused the defect, as might be 
inferred from use of the term sufficient cause. 
Id. at 1243–44. 
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
The word “substantial” is used to denote the fact that the defendant’s conduct has 
such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a 
cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea 
of responsibility, rather than in the so-called “philosophic sense,” which includes 
every one of the great number of events without which any happening would not 
have occurred.  Each of these events is a cause in the so-called “philosophic sense,” 
yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think 
of them as causes. 
Id.; see also Sebok, supra note 4, at 66 (“[T]he phrase ‘substantial factor’ was meant to narrow 
the class of but-for causes that ought to be recognized as a basis for liability by excluding 
insubstantial or trivial causes.”). 
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  These 
considerations “are actually limitations on what conduct can qualify as a substantial factor.”  
June, 577 F.3d at 1241. 
63. See generally Smith, supra note 31, at 309–10 (discussing the notion of substantial as 
a limitation in proximate cause prong of causation). 
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
65. Sebok, supra note 4, at 67. 
66. Id. at 64 (“A careful reading of the Restatement provisions . . . suggests that they were 
not intended to have the effect of supplanting or replacing but-for causation.  Rather, they were 
intended to serve two very different goals.”). 
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sufficient] causes that ought to be recognized as a basis for liability by 
excluding insubstantial or trivial causes.”67 
D. The Third Restatement: The Banishment of Substantial Factor and 
the Advent of Causal Sets 
First published in 2010, the Third Restatement deemed the Second 
Restatement’s treatment of causation through the use and reliance on legal 
cause, proximate cause, and substantial factor to be inadequate.68  It 
proceeded to eliminate the use of the terms “substantial factor,” 
“proximate cause,” and “legal cause” from its causation formulation 
altogether.69  According to the drafters, “[t]he substantial-factor test has 
not . . . withstood the test of time, as it has proved confusing and been 
misused.”70  The problem is the perception that the term “substantial” 
permits either a more rigorous or more lenient standard for factual cause 
resulting from the term’s evaluative character.71  It is deemed to serve as 
a judgmental limitation on liability, where factual cause is an all-or-
nothing proposition.  Specific conduct is either cause in fact or it is not; 
“there are no degrees of factual cause.”72  By eliminating the evaluative 
substantial causation, the fact finder cannot find an otherwise factual (but 
for) cause “insubstantial,” and thus not actionable, or otherwise pick and 
 
67. Id. at 66. 
68. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 26 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“Despite the venerability of the ‘legal cause’ term in 
Restatement history, it has not been widely adopted in judicial and legal discourse, nor is it 
helpful in explicating the ground that it covers.”). 
69. See id. §§ 26–27. 
70. Id. § 26 cmt. j. 
71. See id. § 26 reporters’ note cmt. j; Rue, supra note 2, at 2723.  The substantial factor 
test is “little more than a jurisprudential Rorschach blot—in one circumstance justifying a 
relaxed standard of causation, in another supporting a heightened standard.”  Id. 
The essential requirement, recognized in both Torts Restatements, is that the 
party’s tortious conduct be a necessary condition for the occurrence of the 
plaintiff’s harm: the harm would not have occurred but for the conduct.  To the 
extent that substantial factor is employed instead of the but-for test, it is 
undesirably vague.  As such, it may lure the factfinder into thinking that a 
substantial factor means something less than a but-for cause or, conversely, may 
suggest that the factfinder distinguish among factual causes, determining that some 
are and some are not “substantial factors.”  Thus, use of substantial factor may 
unfairly permit proof of causation on less than a showing that the tortious conduct 
was a but-for cause of harm or may unfairly require some proof greater than the 
existence of but-for causation. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 reporters’ 
note cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 26 reporters’ note cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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choose, on evaluative grounds, tortious acts that are independently 
sufficient to cause harm. 
Under the Third Restatement, causation is essentially twofold: factual 
causation provided in sections 26 through 28,73 and harm within the scope 
of liability, provided in section 29.74  As to factual cause, the but for, or 
sine qua non test, is reaffirmed and set out as the general rule.  Section 26, 
entitled “Factual Cause,” provides: “Tortious conduct must be a factual 
cause of harm for liability to be imposed.  Conduct is a factual cause of 
harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.  
Tortious conduct may also be a factual cause of harm under [Section] 
27.”75 
Section 27, in turn, entitled “Multiple Sufficient Causes,” addresses 
the circumstance of multiple sufficient (or overdetermined) causes, such 
as the twin fires scenario.  It provides: “If multiple acts occur, each of 
which under [section] 26 alone would have been a factual cause of the 
physical harm at the same time in the absence of the other act(s), each act 
is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”76  Section 27 represents an 
extension of section 26, not an exception.  Not only does the Third 
Restatement regard the multiple sufficient scenario addressed by Section 
27 to be “the unusual case,”77 but, as with the Second Restatement, 
“sufficiency” is not defined as a cause that could have caused the harm, 
but a cause that would have in fact (i.e. probably) caused the harm.78  It is 
otherwise justified by “comport[ing] with deep-seated intuitions about 
causation and fairness in attributing responsibility.”79 
Of particular importance is the fact that the Third Restatement subtly 
adopts the notion of causal sets,80 or the “NESS” test.81  That is, defendant 
A will be a factual cause of harm if he is part of a set of other actors or 
causes and that causal set is sufficient to cause harm and A is necessary to 
the set.  Its proponents assert that NESS is an appropriate substitute for 
 
73. See generally id. §§ 26, 28. 
74. See generally id. § 29. 
75. Id. § 26. 
76. Id. § 27. 
77. Id. § 26 cmt. c. 
78. June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009). 
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
80. June, 577 F.3d at 1241–42. 
81. NESS is an acronym for the “Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set.”  See Wright, 
supra note 19, at 1788–1803 (articulating the NESS test and inquiry). 
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the but for test in the “corner” cases,82 where “but for” does not impose 
liability, but our intuition dictates that causation should be found.83 
With reference to the twin fire scenario, causal-set causation would 
exist regardless of whether the defendant’s fire was sufficient to have 
caused the damage alone.  Another example of a causal set involves 
pollution where the accumulation of five units of pollution is sufficient to 
cause injury to seven defendants, acting independently and each 
discharging one unit of pollution each.84  A further example of such a 
corner case is known as preemptive causation.  This exists, for instance, 
where a mechanic fails to make the required repairs to a set of car brakes 
and the driver later fails to use the brake pedal upon approaching an 
intersection, striking the car ahead of him.85 
This causal set notion is somewhat problematic in that it is found in 
the comment section of section 27 of the Third Restatement and expands, 
if not contradicts, the plain terms of both sections 26 and 27 by providing 
that insufficiency is not fatal to establishing factual causation.86  Comment 
f provides that “[t]he fact that an actor’s conduct requires other conduct to 
be sufficient to cause another’s harm does not obviate the applicability of 
[section 27].”87  Other than the general references to asbestos cases and 
academic law reviews, there is little cited support.88  Nonetheless, factual 
cause is deemed established where the harm is caused by a tortious act 
that either alone or as a necessary part of a combination of other factors 
would have caused the harm.89  Stated differently, unnecessary and non-
independently sufficient contributions are a factual cause where they are 
necessary to a causal set, which set is itself sufficient to cause the harm. 
 
82. Rethinking Actual Causation, supra note 18, at 2164 (“[T]here are corner cases in 
which the [but for] conception appears to break down.”). 
83. “The NESS test not only resolves but also clarifies and illuminates the causal issues 
in the problematic causation cases that have plagued tort scholars for generations.”  Wright, 
supra note 19, at 1802.  NESS is “the essence of the concept of causation.”  Id. at 1790. 
84. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 27 cmt. f, illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also Wilcox v. Homestead Mining Co., 619 F.3d 
1165, 1169–70 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding insufficient causal connection between pollution and 
cancer). 
85. See Saunders Sys. Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 117 So. 72, 72–73 (Ala. 1928). 
86. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 27 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
87. Id. 
88. Dirty Harriet, supra note 20, at 1690 (“Sparse precedent supports the inclusion of 
comment f into the Restatement Third.”). 
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 27 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
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The inclusion of the causal set approach to factual cause is a distinct 
change from the Second Restatement.  The Second Restatement does not 
recognize any causal set concept and otherwise permits the fact finder to 
consider whether or not an independently sufficient cause was substantial 
and thus a factual cause or not.90  As noted by one observer, “NESS 
fundamentally challenges the traditional insistence on counterfactual 
causation in the first place.”91 
Section 29 of the Third Restatement restates what was formerly 
deemed “proximate” or “legal” cause as a “scope of liability” framework.  
It provides that “[a]n actor’s liability is limited to those harms that result 
from the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”92  The “scope of 
liability” approach includes intervening and superseding cause issues, as 
well as a “trivial contribution” provision.93  The trivial contribution 
provision provides that “[w]hen an actor’s negligent conduct constitutes 
only a trivial contribution to a causal set that is a factual cause of harm 
under [section] 27, the harm is not within the scope of the actor’s 
liability.”94 
The placement of the trivial contribution principle in scope of 
liability, as opposed to factual cause, is notable in that, according to the 
comments, it seeks to preserve the historical limitation of the liability 
aspect of the substantial factor test.95  Comment b of section 36 also makes 
clear that this trivial contribution exemption sets forth “a narrow rule that 
 
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
91. Dirty Harriet, supra note 20, at 1691. 
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).  Not only does this eliminate the use of, or reference to, either proximate 
or legal cause, it also purges foreseeability from the scope of liability determinations.  The “risk 
standard” set forth in § 29 requires consideration of “the risks that made the actor’s conduct 
tortious,” and “whether the harm for which recovery is sought was a result of any of those risks.”  
Id. § 29 cmt. d.  It is believed to provide “greater clarity” than the foreseeability test because “it 
focuses attention on the particular circumstances that existed at the time of the actor’s conduct 
and the risks that were posed by that conduct.”  Id. § 29 cmt. j. 
93. Id. § 36.  The Third Restatement provides that the risk standard can be applied by fact 
finders “with more sensitivity to the underlying rationale than they might must with the 
unadorned foreseeable-harm standard,” while “[a] foreseeability standard risks being 
misunderstood because of uncertainty about what must be foreseen, by whom, and at what 
time.”  Id. § 29 cmt. j.  The Third Restatement approach regards scope of liability as a non-issue 
in most cases.  Scope of liability will be an issue only in those cases involving a somewhat 
unique fact pattern; that is, where the claimant was within the scope of some harm, but the injury 
is the result of a risk that was not, or was arguably not, one of the risks that made the actor’s 
conduct tortious in the first place. 
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 36 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
95. Id. § 36 cmt. a. 
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[courts] ha[ve] developed as a matter of fairness, equitable-loss 
distribution, and administrative cost.”96  Most notably, section 36 
addresses the potential over-inclusiveness of section 27, particularly 
comment f of section 27, in that a cause does not have to be substantial in 
order to constitute a factual cause in the competing forces scenario.97  In 
order to reel in liability in such circumstances, section 36 exempts trivial 
contributions from an otherwise sufficient cause from liability.98 
Section 36 of the Third Restatement, unlike its counterpart in the 
Second Restatement (section 433), “applies only to one of multiple 
sufficient causes, not to a but-for factual cause.”99  Illustration 2 in section 
36 makes the point that a defendant’s negligence resulted in a small 
amount of water to join with a substantial amount of naturally occurring 
run-off due to spring rains resulting in damage.100  Assuming that the small 
amount of water was “the straw that br[oke] the camel’s back,” the 
defendant could not invoke the trivial exemption of section 36 to limit its 
liability,101 even though the water it negligently released was “a small 
fraction” of the total water which caused the injury.102  This reflects the 
notion that “trivial” can only be understood in comparison to other causes 
with all but for causes constituting actual cause, irrespective of any 
triviality.  The end result is that under the Third Restatement, conduct will 
be a factual cause of harm if it is a but for cause, or a necessary element 
of a sufficient causal set, and the causal contribution is not trivial. 
 
96. Id. § 36 cmt. b. 
97. Id. § 36 cmt. a (noting section intended to prevent causal liability upon conduct while 
a member of a sufficient causal set “pales by comparison to the other contributions to that causal 
set”). 
98. Id. § 36 cmt. b (“[E]xception applies only when there are multiple sufficient causes 
and the tortious conduct at issue constitutes a trivial contribution . . . .”). 
99. June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009). 
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 36 
cmt. b, illus. 2 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
101. Id. § 36 cmt. b.  According to the comments following illustration 1 in section 36: 
The limitation on the scope of liability provided in this Section is not applicable if 
the trivial contributing cause is necessary for the outcome; this Section is only 
applicable when the outcome is overdetermined (§ 27).  By contrast, the actor who 
negligently provides the straw that breaks the camel’s back is subject to liability 
for the broken back. 
Id. 
102. Id. § 36 cmt. b, illus. 2. 
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III. THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE 
Massachusetts cases have referenced the substantial factor,103 
substantial contributing cause,104 and substantial legal factor105 tests 
interchangeably, with the concept first entering Massachusetts appellate 
parlance following—and with direct reference to—the publication of the 
First Restatement.106  Massachusetts continued to reference the substantial 
factor rubric with the advent of the Second Restatement in 1965.107  The 
substantial factor rubric has steadily grown in use to include toxic tort or 
asbestos cases, as well as cases involving multiple causes or defendants.  
Indeed, it is often used as the operative test for causation in any negligence 
or related action.108 
 
103. See, e.g., Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 990 N.E.2d 997, 1021 (Mass. 2013); Morin 
v. AutoZone Ne., Inc., 943 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011). 
104. See, e.g., Klairmont v. Gainsboro Rest., Inc., 987 N.E.2d 1247, 1251 (Mass. 2013) 
(noting jury’s finding that defendant’s violation of the building code was not a “substantial 
contributing cause” of death); LeBlanc v. Pierce Motor Co., 30 N.E.2d 684, 686 (Mass. 1940) 
(finding evidence sufficient as to vehicle owner’s negligence being “a substantial contributing 
cause of the accident”); Hoa Ho v. Hodin, No. 11–P–1628, 2013 WL 1314522, at *1 (Mass. 
App. Ct. Apr. 3, 2013) (referencing trial court’s use of “substantial contributing cause”); 
Miyazaki v. Works, No. 11–P–2176, 2012 WL 6049083, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 6, 2012) 
(defining substantial contributing cause as being “one of several causes of [harm],” while stating 
that it must still be a cause “without which [the accident] would not otherwise have occurred”). 
105. See, e.g., Tritsch v. Bos. Edison Co., 293 N.E.2d 264, 266–67 (Mass. 1973); Nemet 
v. Bos. Water & Sewer Comm’n, 775 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). 
106. Quinby v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 61 N.E.2d 853, 858 (Mass. 1945) (showing that 
sufficient evidence of causation as to the negligence of the gate tender by failing to raise the 
gate earlier constituted a substantial factor in bringing about damage; citing the First 
Restatement); McKenna v. Andreassi, 197 N.E. 879, 882–83 (Mass. 1935) (“[V]iolation of the 
ordinance was not a substantial factor in causing the accident.”); see Gosselin v. Silver, 17 
N.E.2d 706, 707 (Mass. 1938) (showing that use of excessive force was a substantial factor in 
causing bodily injury); Vigneault v. Dr. Hewson Dental Co., 15 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Mass. 1938) 
(showing that either extraction or negligent anesthetization was sufficient to produce infection 
and could be considered a substantial factor in bringing about the harm).  The earliest 
Massachusetts case referencing “substantial contributing cause” is Wheeler v. City of Worcester, 
92 Mass. 591 (1865).  There, a property owner whose building was damaged by flooding water 
sued multiple defendants and contended that, “[i]f either of the three causes of 
obstruction . . . , or all of them combined, were substantial contributing causes of the 
flooding . . . , then the defendants [were] responsible.”  Id. at 594.  The court did not specifically 
address the contention, finding, inter alia, that deposits from underground sewer were not “so 
considerable as to form any substantial part of the causes of the flooding.”  Id. at 599. 
107. Delicata v. Bourlesses, 404 N.E.2d 667, 671 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (“[A]n injured 
party is permitted to sue a tortfeasor for the full amount of damages for an indivisible injury that 
the tortfeasor’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing, even if the concurrent negligence 
of others contributed to the incident.”). 
108. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 510, 511 (Mass. 1988); 
Bernier v. Bos. Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391, 399–400 (Mass. 1980); Bonoldi v. DJP Hosp., 
Inc., No. 15–P–780, 2016 WL 4577493, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 2, 2016); Wess v. 
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The present-day use of substantial factor causation in Massachusetts 
is derived from reliance upon the following: the rule of joint and several 
liability, decisions addressing causation in asbestos or toxic tort cases, as 
well as dicta in a loss of chance case.109  Upon inspection, these sources 
do not justify a wholesale substitution of substantial factor causation with 
but for factual causation in any multiple defendant or multiple cause case.  
This is true even without the Third Restatement’s fodder for the position 
that the use of substantial factor causation is problematic and should be 
discarded altogether.110  To date, no Massachusetts appellate court has 
adopted the factual causation framework of the Third Restatement.  The 
use of “substantial factor” in Massachusetts is discussed in the following 
sections. 
A. Speeding Motorcycles and “Contributing” Harm 
A precursor to the potential demise of the but for test in 
Massachusetts was Corey v. Havener,111 which was later cited by the 
Second Restatement and subsequent decisions as supporting the use of the 
substantial factor test in multiple defendant or multiple cause cases.112  
There, the two defendants, riding noisy motorcycles passed the plaintiff’s 
wagon on each side, frightening the plaintiff’s horses, causing them to run 
away and injure the plaintiff.113 
The court noted that the jury had found both defendants liable and 
upheld the finding of liability on appeal stating: 
It makes no difference that there was no concert between them, or that 
it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by 
each.  If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both.  
Whether each contributed was a question for the jury. 
 
Butterworth, No. 14–P–1790, 2016 WL 3474846, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. June 27, 2016); Peters 
v. Shaw’s Supermarkets, Inc., No. 15–P–1304, 2016 WL 3460633, at *3 (Mass. App. Ct. June 
24, 2016); Hannon v. Calleva, No. 14–P–1061, 2015 WL 4079832, at *1–2 (Mass. App. Ct. 
July 7, 2015); Pitts v. Wingate at Brighton, Inc., 972 N.E.2d 74, 80 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012); 
Supeno v. Equity Office Props. Mgmt., LLC, 874 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
109. See Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 842–44 (Mass. 2008) (addressing 
“substantial factor” in loss of chance claim); O’Connor, 518 N.E.2d at 512–13 (addressing “but 
for” and “substantial factor” in asbestos litigation). 
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
reporters’ note cmt. j (articulating elimination of substantial factor language as it calls for 
improper evaluative discretion); see also id. § 27 reporters’ note cmt. b. 
111. See Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902). 
112. FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.3 (2d ed. 1986) (citing Corey, 
65 N.E. at 69). 
113. Corey, 65 N.E. at 69. 
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. . . . 
If both defendants contributed to the accident, the jury could not single 
out one as the person to blame.114 
The decision in Corey, at first blush, appears to be a twin fire, or 
“over-determined cause,” analogue.  Yet, it is not.115  It essentially resorts 
to an expanded joint and several liability rule without expressly stating 
so.116  The notion of joint and several liability for an indivisible injury 
became well established at common law, although later modified by 
statute.117  At common law, an indivisible injury results when two or more 
causes combine to produce a single injury incapable of division on any 
reasonable basis.118  Joint and several liability initially emerged where the 
tortious actors either acted in concert or through a conspiracy.119  In such 
 
114. Id. (citations omitted). 
115. Richard W. Wright & Ingeborg Puppe, Causation: Linguistic, Philosophical, Legal 
and Economic, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 461, 486 (2016) (noting that Corey is erroneously and 
commonly cited as an example of a multiple sufficient cause case). 
116. See Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in 
Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 908 (2005) (citing Corey as an example of 
common law joint and several liability). 
117. Chase v. Roy, 294 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Mass. 1973) (alteration in original) (“[T]he law 
here must be considered as settled, that if two or more wrongdoers negligently contribute to the 
personal injury of another by their several acts, which operate concurrently . . . they are jointly 
and severally liable.” (quoting Feneff v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 82 N.E. 705, 707 (Mass. 1907))); 
Herman v. Horne Realty Inc., No. 08-ADMS-10038, 2009 WL 1846312, at *2 (Mass. App. Div. 
June 24, 2009); see Bryant v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 131 Mass. 491, 503 (1881); Bos. & Albany 
R.R. v. Shanly, 107 Mass. 568, 579 (1871). 
118. Gifford, supra note 116, at 908 (“Traditional common law holds that where the 
tortious acts of two or more defendants are each a cause-in-fact of an indivisible injury to the 
plaintiff, the defendants are jointly and severally liable.”); see also Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 
F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (D. Mass. 1981) (citing Gurney v. Tenney, 84 N.E. 428, 430 (Mass. 1908)). 
119. Massachusetts law recognizes the concert of action theory of tort liability.  Under 
this theory, a defendant who has an agreement with another to perform a tortious act or to 
achieve a tortious result may be liable to a plaintiff, even if that defendant was not the cause-in-
fact of the injury.  See Payton, 512 F. Supp. at 1035 (“The plaintiff need not prove the existence 
of an agreement by direct evidence.” (citing Nelson v. Nason, 177 N.E.2d 887, 888 (Mass. 
1961))).  Rather, an agreement may be inferred if the conduct of the defendants suggests a 
tortious implied meeting of the minds.  Id.; Nelson, 177 N.E.2d at 888 (holding that although 
the parties claimed that they did not agree to drag race, such an agreement was inferred).  
Massachusetts has adopted the Second Restatement’s approach to this issue.  Payton, 512 
F. Supp. at 1034–35.  Section 876 of the Second Restatement, titled “Persons Acting in 
Concert,” provides:  
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is 
subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant 
to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself . . . . 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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circumstances, there was no need to address the cause and effect of each 
actor’s conduct separately; only collectively.  The Corey court notes the 
“in concert” requirement, but holds that joint liability remains appropriate 
even absent strict concerted action under the circumstances.120  While not 
expressly stated, it was clear in Corey that the defendants’ negligent 
conduct was concurrent and that the injury was indivisible, justifying joint 
liability.121 
The rule as to joint and several liability is not a substitute for 
causation;122 it is fundamentally a rule of procedure.123  It provides that a 
plaintiff harmed by multiple tortfeasors can sue one or more of them, 
recover judgment against one or more of them, and collect on the 
judgment against one or more of them.124  The fact that it has been 
expanded upon and allowed to be based on separate acts and does not 
require either conspiracy or concerted action does not justify the 
imposition of liability without proper causal connection.  Concurrence and 
 
120. Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69, 69 (Mass. 1902). 
121. JOSEPH R. NOLAN & LAURIE J. SARTORIO, TORT LAW, 37A MASSACHUSETTS 
PRACTICE SERIES § 25.1 (3d ed. 2005); see Chase, 294 N.E.2d at 340 (citing Feneff, 82 N.E. at 
707 (stating the rule and need for concurrence and that damages are “inseparable”)).  “Common 
law joint and several liability evolved on the theory that, as between an injured, innocent 
plaintiff and defendants whose breach of some duty is proximately related to the injury, it is 
preferable to allocate the risk of a default in the payment of due compensation to the 
defendants.”  Harsh v. Petroll, 887 A.2d 209, 217 (Pa. 2005).  Central to this doctrine is that the 
harm is indivisible and the negligent acts are “concurrent.”  Edmunds v. Compagnie Generale 
Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1979); see also NOLAN & SARTORIO, supra (“The 
litmus test [for joint and several liability] consists of concurrent negligence and inseparable 
damages.”).  Concurrence would at least require that the putative act be operative at the time of 
the harm and act together with the other asserted acts.  “The question is primarily not the fact 
of causation, but of the feasibility and practical convenience of splitting up the total harm into 
separate parts which may be attributed to each of two or more causes.”  KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 13, § 52, at 345.  Joint tortfeasors and concurrent negligence are legally distinguishable 
concepts.  The term “joint tortfeasors” refers to a situation where one person is vicariously liable 
for the torts of another (e.g., employer for employee, if within scope), or where two or more 
people act together in further of some common design or purpose.  Cf. Chase, 294 N.E.2d at 
340.  Concurrent negligence is where two or more actors cause the same injury as a result of 
their separate tortious acts. 
122. Three Arguable Mistakes, supra note 28, at 1014 (“The standard (procedural) joint-
and-several-liability doctrine does no cause-in-fact work.”). 
123. See Donnelly v. Larkin, 98 N.E.2d 280, 285–86 (Mass. 1951). 
124. See O’Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 510, 513 (Mass. 1988)  (“[I]f two 
or more wrongdoers negligently contribute to the personal injury of another by their several 
acts, which operate concurrently, so that in effect the damages suffered are rendered inseparable, 
they are jointly and severally liable.” (quoting Chase, 294 N.E. 2d. at 340)); Mitchell v. Hastings 
& Koch Enters., Inc., 647 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that when the 
negligence of the operators of two vehicles constitutes concurrent causes of injuries, they are 
jointly and severally liable to plaintiff). 
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indivisible injury remain necessary prerequisites.  Even if there is 
concurrence and an indivisible injury, there still remains the need to 
establish causation.  This burden of proof remains even if there is no 
obligation to show what specific portion of the injury was attributable to 
which joint tortfeasor.125  The “but for,” or sufficient, concept is a plain 
and necessary component in showing that the tortfeasor “contributed” to 
the harm or injury. 
Corey is also noteworthy in that there was no mention or discussion 
of factual causation, including either but for or substantial factor 
causation.126  Rather, the causal nexus as to joint liability was simply noted 
to require “contribut[ion].”127  There is no reference to the contribution 
needing to be something other than “but for.”  Nonetheless, both earlier 
and later case law, as well as legal commentators and the Restatement, 
cited to Corey for the proposition that the causal nexus must be either 
sufficient to cause the harm or a substantial factor in causing the harm.128  
Indeed, by 1950, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) cited to 
Corey (post-First Restatement) as standing for the proposition that 
 
125. See Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 725–26 (Cal. 1989) (Mosk, 
J., dissenting) (representing that the nexus must be “sufficient” (citing Corey, 65 N.E. at 69)); 
see also Oulighan v. Butler, 75 N.E. 726, 728 (Mass. 1905). 
In the practical furtherance of justice, it is a principle of the law of torts that where 
two or more wrongdoers injure another in person or in property by their several 
acts, all of which are concurrent and contribute to one wrong, but which might 
have been caused by each, then, if upon the evidence no distinction can be drawn 
between their acts, they all are jointly or severally liable. 
Id. (citing Corey, 65 N.E. at 69); Payton v. Abbott Labs Inc., 780 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(explaining that under the law of Massachusetts, joint and several liability may attach to each 
cause where there is evidence that two causes for which liability may attach are probably 
involved in an injury, but their respective causal roles cannot be separated).  See Bos. & Albany 
R.R. Co. v. Shanley, 107 Mass. 568, 579 (1871), for cases prior to Corey: 
The many ways in which wrongdoers may injure another give rise to some nice 
distinctions; but when their several acts directly contribute to produce a single 
injury, each being sufficient to have caused the whole, and it is impossible to 
distinguish the portions of injury caused by each, that concurrence ought to render 
each of them liable for the whole in a joint action.  On this ground, the 
manufacturers who sent the articles are jointly liable in this action. 
Id.  The Second Restatement also cited Corey for the substantial factor test.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 432 cmt. d, illus. 3 & reporter’s notes (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
126. Corey, 89 N.E.at 69. 
127. Id. 
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 reporters’ note cmt. d, illus. 3 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1965). 
 
4 - WEIGAND. PUBLISHER READY. 2.19.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  10:38 PM 
2019] WRONGFUL DEMISE OF BUT FOR CAUSATION 97 
causation for joint liability was established on the showing of “substantial 
factor.”129 
B. Asbestos and O’Connor v. Raymark Industries, Inc. 
The SJC’s 1988 decision in O’Connor v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 
involving toxic tort and asbestos, is another frequently cited source 
supporting or implying the abandonment of but for causation and the use 
of “substantial factor” in any multiple cause or multiple defendant 
action.130  However, the decision does not fairly support the wholesale 
displacement of but for causation with “substantial factor.” 
In O’Connor, the plaintiff brought mesothelioma claims against 
seventeen defendants, sixteen of whom had settled prior to trial.131  On 
appeal, as to the defense verdict for the sole remaining defendant, the 
plaintiff challenged the special verdict slip and jury instructions on 
causation.  The plaintiff argued that substantial contributing cause was 
defined to require that “the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s 
product must make a difference in the result”—essentially but for 
causation.132  The plaintiff further complained that the instructions 
“required the plaintiff to apportion the injury, at least to the extent of 
separating out the effect of the defendant’s product from the combined 
effect of all the asbestos dust which her late husband inhaled.”133  The 
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, although it noted it to be a “close” 
question.134  It held that, 
Read in context, the judge’s statement served to distinguish between a 
“substantial factor,” tending along with other factors to produce the 
plaintiff’s disease and death, and a negligible factor, so slight or so 
tangential to the harm caused that, even when combined with other 
factors, it could not reasonably be said to have contributed to the 
result.135 
The court otherwise reiterated that the plaintiff did not have the 
burden to prove but for causation or to distinguish the particular effect of 
 
129. Whalen v. Shivek, 93 N.E.2d 393, 397 (Mass. 1950); see also Mahoney v. Beatman, 
147 A. 762, 767 (Conn. 1929) (citing Corey for the proposition that concurrent causation 
requires that the act be a substantial factor). 
130. O’Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 510, 510 (Mass. 1988). 
131. Id. at 510–13. 
132. Id. at 512 (claiming the lower court’s jury instructions to be in error). 
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the defendant’s product from the effect of the other asbestos products.136  
Further, the court reiterated the general rule of joint and several liability: 
“[I]f two or more wrongdoers negligently contribute to the personal injury 
of another by their several acts, which operate concurrently, so that in 
effect the damages suffered are rendered inseparable, they are jointly and 
severally liable.”137 
Wholesale reliance upon O’Connor as justification for, or creation of, 
a general exception and substitute for but for factual causation in any 
multiple defendant or multiple cause case is unjustified.  The case centered 
around the unique circumstances posed in asbestos cases and the fact that 
medical science is unable to determine the threshold asbestos fiber dose 
or exposure necessary to cause the disease.  As the court of appeals noted 
in Morin v. AutoZone Northeast, Inc., “[b]ecause the resulting injury may 
not emerge for years or decades after exposure, the law does not require 
the plaintiff . . . to establish the precise brand names of the asbestos-
bearing products, the particular occasions of exposure, or the specific 
allocation of causation among multiple defendants’ products.”138  As a 
result, the causation obligation in asbestos cases is unique, requiring a 
claimant to establish only: “(1) that the defendant’s product contained 
asbestos (product identification), (2) that the victim was exposed to the 
asbestos in the defendant’s product (exposure), and (3) that such exposure 
was a substantial contributing factor in causing harm to the victim 
(substantial factor).”139 
Consequently, while but for causation is not expressly required, 
causation remains established where there is evidence that the defendant 
contributed to the resulting injury, and where there is evidence of a degree 
of exposure being “greater than ‘insignificant or de minimis.’”140  This is, 
 
136. Id. 
137. Id. (quoting Chase v. Roy, 294 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Mass. 1973)).  The court noted 
“[t]he ‘substantial factor’ formulation is one concerning legal significance rather than factual 
quantum.”  Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 41, at 267). 
138. Morin v. AutoZone Ne., Inc., 943 N.E.2d 495, 498 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011). 
139. Id. at 499 (citing Welch v. Keene Corp., 575 N.E.2d 766, 769–70 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1991)); see O’Connor, 518 N.E.2d at 511–12; see also Kreppein v. Celotex Corp., 969 F.2d 
1424, 1425 (2nd Cir. 1992) (“[The court rejects] a strict requirement for proof of causation in 
asbestos cases.”); In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 817–18 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(adopting a “less restrictive approach” to causation in asbestos cases); Barraford v. T & N Ltd., 
988 F. Supp. 2d 81, 88 (D. Mass. 2013) (“As to causation, ‘the plaintiff need not produce 
evidence of “but for” causation on the part of the targeted product, but only of its contribution 
to causation of the resulting injury.’” (quoting Morin, 943 N.E.2d at 499)). 
140. Morin, 943 N.E.2d at 499–500 (“[T]he adjusted standard of proof of causation does 
not relax to a level of speculation.  The plaintiff must produce evidence of a degree of exposure 
greater than ‘insignificant or de minimis.’” (quoting Welch, 575 N.E.2d at 770)); see Payton v. 
 
4 - WEIGAND. PUBLISHER READY. 2.19.2019 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/28/2019  10:38 PM 
2019] WRONGFUL DEMISE OF BUT FOR CAUSATION 99 
in fact, one of the functions of “substantial factor,” in that it was “to excuse 
defendants whose conduct is a but-for cause of harm when the effect of 
that conduct ‘is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of [it] 
as [a] cause[].’”141  Courts have so far found expert testimony to be central 
in establishing that the exposure was a significant contributing factor to 
the disease.142  The battleground remains over what is more than a nominal 
or trivial exposure; whether an expert’s mere incantation that any 
exposure was a significant contributing factor is sufficient; and whether 
there must be evidence quantifying the exposure to assist and justify any 
finding of substantial contributing cause.143 
O’Connor is a questionable basis for substituting “substantial factor” 
for “but for” in any multiple defendant or multiple cause case not only 
because of  its unique circumstances (i.e. asbestos), but because it likewise 
conflates “contribution” with “causation.”144  “Exposure to multiple 
products means in most such cases that no defendant is more likely than 
not a ‘but for’ cause, and it also means that most defendants contributed 
nothing to the actual injury.  The conceptual shift to contribution does not 
work to avoid this plaintiff’s conundrum.”145  It remains that the 
asbestos/mesothelioma claims are unique to causation.  This stems from 
the long latency period and resulting difficulty in identifying defendants 
whose products plaintiffs were exposed to, as well as difficulty in 
determining the amount of exposure created by any particular defendant 
and that exposure’s “contribution” to the injury.  As noted, “[n]ot only is 
substantial factor an inadequate finger in the hole of the dike, there is the 
 
Abbott Labs, 780 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir. 1985); O’Connor, 518 N.E.2d at 511 (requiring that 
the plaintiff prove “more than just a casual or minimal contact”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 433B cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
141. Joseph Sanders et al., The Insubstantiality of the “Substantial Factor” Test for 
Causation, 73 MO. L. REV. 399, 419 (2008) (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a). 
142. Welch, 575 N.E.2d at 770.  The court found the jury could infer that plaintiff’s 
exposure was a “substantial factor” because plaintiff offered expert testimony explaining that 
plaintiff’s disease “was caused by the cumulative effect of all the [asbestos] dust that he had 
inhaled over the span of his career.”  Id. 
143. Massachusetts courts have required, in order to state a triable claim, that the person 
“worked with, or in close proximity to, defendants’ asbestos products.”  Id. at 769; see also 
Roehling v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Bldg. Prods., 786 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(“The evidence, circumstantial as it may be, need only establish that [plaintiff] was in the same 
vicinity as witnesses who can identify the products causing the asbestos dust that all people in 
that area, not just the product handlers, inhaled.”); O’Connor, 518 N.E.2d at 511 (holding that 
the exposure must be “more than just casual or minimum exposure”). 
144. O’Connor, 518 N.E.2d at 513. 
145. Bert Black & David H. Hollander, Jr., Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 
U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (1993). 
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possibility that the substantial factor rubric will be shuttled off to other 
contexts to eliminate liability where the concerns involved in asbestos 
litigation do not exist.”146 
The reference to the joint and several rule in O’Connor is also 
problematic as it was dicta.  Leaving aside that neither “concurrence” nor 
“indivisible injury” particularly applied as there was only one defendant 
at issue, the joint and several liability rule as it relies on “contribution” 
simply leaves the causation question unanswered.  The recitation of the 
joint and several liability rule added nothing to the dispositive analysis as 
to cause and effect, as the rule is not a substitute for the proper showing 
of causation.147 
C. Loss of Chance and Matsuyama v. Birnbaum 
The 2008 decision, Matsuyama v. Birnbaum,148 is another leading 
decision frequently cited for the proposition that substantial factor 
causation, rather than but for causation, is the appropriate instruction in 
any multiple cause or multiple defendant case.149  In Matsuyama, the SJC 
recognized loss of chance as a cognizable harm under the wrongful death 
statute.150  In effect, the court reconceptualized recoverable harm under 
the statute and determined that such harm was not limited to death, but 
also the loss of a statistical chance of cure or better outcome.  Rather than 
receiving full damages for the adverse outcome, the claimant is only 
entitled to the value of the lost opportunity (i.e., the difference in the 
chances before the negligence from the chances after). 151  By recognizing 
the loss of the chance as the harm, the court did not opt to employ or adopt 
any modified test as to causation such as “a diluted substantial-factor or 
other factual-causation test.”152  Thus, there is no modification of factual 
causation.  Instead, there is a reconceptualization of harm with the 
Matsuyama rule—in effect, a species of proportional liability. 
In commenting on causation in a loss of chance case, the court stated, 
 
146. Sanders, et al., supra note 141, at 429. 
147. See Hobbs v. TLT Constr. Corp., 935 N.E.2d 1290, 1292 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s claim that trial court erred in failing to instruct on joint and several liability 
under O’Connor, as harms were not indivisible). 
148. Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 2008). 
149. Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 3d 251, 266 n.7 (D. Mass. 2014); 
Bonoldi v. DJP Hosp., Inc., No. 15–P–780, 2016 WL 4577493, at *1–2 (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 
2, 2016); Hannon v. Calleva, No. 14–P–1061, 2015 WL 4079832, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. July 7, 
2015). 
150. Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 835–38. 
151. Id. at 842–43. 
152. Id. at 832 n.29 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (AM. LAW INST. Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005)). 
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The defendants claim that the evidence was insufficient to show 
that, as the judge instructed the jury, “an act or omission of [the 
defendant] was a substantially contributing factor to the death of Mr. 
Matsuyama.”  The “substantial contributing factor” test is useful in 
cases in which damage has multiple causes, including but not limited 
to cases with multiple tortfeasors in which it may be impossible to say 
for certain that any individual defendant’s conduct was a but-for cause 
of the harm, even though it can be shown that the defendants, in the 
aggregate, caused the harm.  The substantial contributing factor test is 
less appropriate, however, as an instruction as to cause in a loss of 
chance case in which one defendant’s malpractice alone is alleged to 
have caused the victim’s diminished likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome.  The proper test in a loss of chance case concerning the 
conduct of a single defendant is whether that conduct was the but-for 
cause of the loss of chance.153 
This passage, which is dictum, is of potential concern to the extent 
that it is intended or interpreted as suggesting that causation can be 
established by a showing of something less than “but for” in any multiple 
defendant case, or that but for causation is limited to single defendant 
causes or cases.154 
First, the Matsuyama court noted that “substantial factor” was a “less 
appropriate” test for causation where there is a single defendant and an 
identifiable harm.155  It found that the instruction, including reference to 
“substantial,” sufficiently “focused the jury’s attention on the idea that 
[the defendant physician’s] negligence, if any, had to be a but for cause of 
[the plaintiff’s] losing a ‘fair chance of survival.’”156  It is compelling that 
the court referenced the use of “substantial factor” as “less appropriate” in 
the single defendant action.  It is “less appropriate” because using 
“substantial factor” in lieu of “but for” is to invite the potential alteration 
(i.e., dilute or heighten) of the necessary showing between the negligent 
act and the harm, justifying imposing responsibility on the defendant.  Yet, 
 
153. Id. at 842 (footnotes omitted). 
154. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 26 cmt. n. 
155. Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 842. 
156. Id. at 843; see also Three Arguable Mistakes, supra note 28, at 1019. 
Courts sometimes grasp that the substantial-factor test is appropriate for only a 
narrow range of multiple-cause situations, but quite often they go badly wrong by 
assuming that the but-for test can be jettisoned in favor of a much vaguer and less 
demanding substantial-factor inquiry in any case in which the tortfeasor’s conduct 
has combined with other causal conditions in any way creating difficulties for the 
plaintiff. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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this fundamental social justification applies to all defendants, including 
where there is more than one defendant in a single case. 
Further, even in single defendant cases, there are other potential 
causes.  The causation dispute in Matsuyama, for instance, was between 
whether the alleged failure to timely diagnose or whether the underlying 
disease itself (i.e., cancer and its biology) caused the death or the loss of 
an opportunity of cure.  Despite this dueling causal dispute, the court 
considered the substantial factor test to be “less appropriate” in order to 
maintain the necessary burden.157 
Second, there was only one defendant in Matsuyama along with a 
specific and asserted loss of a statistical chance of cure.  However, even if 
there were other defendants, their respective acts would need to be 
independently shown to have been sufficient to have caused the respective 
harm unless they were acting in concurrence or in concert.  Any 
appreciable difference in time, for instance, as to the negligent acts (i.e., 
failure to diagnose) would likely result in a “different” loss of chance.  To 
the extent the harm sought would be death and thus considered an 
indivisible harm, it remains that the separate acts of negligence would 
have to be shown to have been sufficient and independent of other 
causes—whether another defendant or the underlying disease—to have 
caused the death.  While the court stated the general rule as to joint and 
several liability—that is, “multiple tortfeasors in which it may be 
impossible to say for certain that any individual defendant’s conduct was 
a but-for cause of the harm”158—the court’s wording, while accurate, 
remains misleading to the extent that it is interpreted or relied upon as 
standing for or supporting the proposition that in a multiple defendant or 
multiple cause action, it need not be shown that each individual 
defendant’s conduct be independently sufficient to cause the harm.  The 
defendant’s conduct must be a but for or sufficient cause of the harm, 
leaving aside any causative role other defendants or other causes may or 
may not have had. 
Finally, the Matsuyama court cited to and relied upon the asbestos 
decision in O’Connor, which remains the unique circumstance in which 
medical science was unable to say what the threshold dose of asbestos 
fibers or exposure is necessary to cause the disease.159  Due to the nature 
of the disease process, which can occur over decades and involve multiple 
sources of exposure, choosing which fibers came from which defendants 
was not possible, resulting in the judicial modification to causation.  This 
 
157. Matsuyama, 890 N.E. 2d at 842–43. 
158. Id. at 842. 
159. Id. at 842 & n.47. 
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unique circumstance was not applicable to Matsuyama.  The recitation of 
the joint and several liability rule does not address, nor is it a substitute 
for, requiring the proper factual causation test in multiple defendant or 
multiple cause cases. 
IV. THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR AND THE 
PRIMACY OF “BUT FOR” 
“Substantial contributing cause,” or “substantial contributing factor,” 
is a common and fundamental, if not primary, term used in instructions 
for causation involving any multiple defendant or multiple cause case.160  
O’Connor and Matsuyama, in turn, remain frequently relied upon in 
support of using the substantial factor test.161  Although there are 
instructions and cases indicating that substantial contributing cause or 
factor is defined in terms of “but for” consistent with the Second 
Restatement,162 there are cases and instances where it is not,163 with the 
ever present concern that but for causation no longer has a seat at the head 
of the causation table. 
The Third Restatement has made a case against the use of “substantial 
factor” as an operative standard for causation, with its drafters asserting 
that the test has not “withstood the test of time, as it has proved confusing 
and been misused.”164  While the Third Restatement agrees that use of 
“substantial factor” “can be useful” in the multiple sufficient cause 
scenario, it finds “substantial factor” to be “overuse[d]” and “abuse[d].”165  
A clear and present danger of the substantial factor test is that its use 
outside of the rather limited “twin fire” or multiple sufficient cause case 
 
160. See cases cited supra note 3. 
161. See, e.g., Bonoldi v. DJP Hosp., Inc., No. 15–P–780, 2016 WL 4577493, at *1 (Mass. 
App. Ct. Sept. 2, 2016); Hannon v. Calleva, No. 14–P–1061, 2015 WL 4079832, at *2 (Mass. 
App. Ct. July 7, 2015); Pitts v. Wingate at Brighton, Inc., 972 N.E.2d 74, 80 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2012). 
162. Bonoldi, 2016 WL 4577493, at *1.  There, the appeals court rejected any error in the 
trial court’s instruction on causation using “substantial factor” where the claimant brought a 
negligence action against both a lessor and an entity responsible for maintenance as to an alleged 
slip and fall.  Id.  The court found no error in using “substantial factor” and cited Matsuyama, 
noting that there were not only two defendants, but also evidence that the claimant suffered from 
preexisting migraine headaches.  Id. 
163. See, e.g., Final Jury Instructions at 21–22, Powell v. Fuller, No. 2012-0740 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 2017). 
164. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). 
165. Id. at reporters’ notes cmt. j.  The drafters noted that to the extent certain courts use 
“substantial factor” instead of “but for,” it is “undesirably vague.”  Id. 
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will encourage juries to find causation even when the defendant’s conduct 
is not a but for or sufficient cause of the plaintiff’s injury.166 
The Third Restatement’s criticism includes uncertainty over whether 
substantial factor causation is to be a cause in fact or proximate cause 
consideration.167  Further, the concern includes whether substantial factor 
causation is potentially worse than but for causation, insofar as “avoiding 
the misconception that a single cause must be found for an outcome.”168  
The Third Restatement also finds that the use of “substantial factor” to 
distinguish insignificant or trivial causes in order to prevent imposition of 
liability for such causes contravenes the premise that factual cause is not 
one of degree.169  As such, the Third Restatement refuses to employ 
“substantial factor” and instead: (a) re-emphasizes the primacy of the but 
for test; (b) uses the “sufficiency” or “necessary condition” approach for 
actions involving multiple and sufficient causal sets; and (c) requires that 
the issue of insignificance or triviality of a cause be assessed as part of the 
scope of liability inquiry (proximate cause).170 
Neither the SJC nor the court of appeals has addressed whether the 
Third Restatement’s approach will be adopted.  Such an adoption would 
represent a significant change in both the terminology and scope of current 
precedent due to the complete banishment of the substantial factor test as 
well as the inclusion of the causal set notion.  In 2015, a claimant asked 
the court of appeals to adopt the Third Restatement’s causation 
formulation, including the concept that use of substantial contributing 
factor is inappropriate where multiple causes or tortfeasors are not 
present.171  The court of appeals held it was unnecessary to address 
whether the use of “substantial factor” in the instruction was proper, as 
there was evidence that the neck injury was caused by an event, or events, 
prior to the motorcycle accident.172  Citing O’Connor, the court of appeals 
held that the instruction “properly differentiated between a substantial 
factor that could give rise to liability and a negligible factor that could 
 
166. See generally id. at cmt. j.  The Third Restatement finds “substantial factor” 
problematic as it “is employed alternatively to impose a more rigorous standard for factual cause 
or to provide a more lenient standard.”  Id. 
167. Id. at reporters’ notes cmt. j (“[Substantial factor’s] evaluative 
component . . . make[s] it appear to be doing scope-of-liability (proximate-cause) duty.”). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at cmt. j (“There is no question of degree [with factual causation].”). 
170. Id. §§ 26–27, 36. 
171. Hannon v. Calleva, No. 14–P–1061, 2015 WL 4079832, at *1–2 (Mass. App. Ct. 
July 7, 2015) (citing O’Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 510, 513 (Mass. 1988)). 
172. Id. at *2. 
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not.”173  Notably, the instruction otherwise included the need to establish 
but for causation and that, while there may be multiple potential causes, 
the defendant’s negligence must be “a substantial contributing factor to 
bringing about the injury.”174 
A further issue with substantial factor causation is the difficulty in 
defining its substantial versus insignificant or trivial divide.  The various 
approaches fall into three general categories: (1) defining substantial by 
utilizing some or all of the definition and factors provided by the Second 
Restatement;175 (2) defining it as the same or part of the proximate, that is 
“natural and probable,” consequence formulation;176 and (3) providing no 
definition and leaving it to the common sense and judgment of the fact 
finder.177 
The Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) model 
instruction opts to leave “substantial factor” to the construction and 
application of the fact finder.178  This is not unlike courts in other 
jurisdictions, which have found either that “[t]he meaning of the term 
 
173. Id. (citing O’Connor, 518 N.E.2d at 513). 
174. Id. at *1 n.2.  The portion of the instruction quoted by the court included: 
 To prove proximate cause, the plaintiff, Mr. Hannon, must show that there 
is a greater likelihood or probability that the harm complained of was due to the 
causes for which the defendant was responsible, than it was not. 
 The plaintiff is not required to eliminate entirely, all possibility that the 
defendant’s conduct was not the cause.  It is enough if he establishes that it is more 
probable that the event caused by the defendant, than it was caused by another 
event. 
 It is for you to determine upon consideration of all the evidence, whether it 
is more likely than not that Mr. Hannon’s injuries would not have occurred but for 
the defendant’s action or inaction. 
 The plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant’s conduct was the 
sole cause.  Most events in life are the product of more than one cause or force.  It 
is enough if Mr. Hannon proves that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial 
contributing factor to bringing about the injury. 
Id. 
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (AM. LAW INST. 1964). 
176. See Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 317 (Cal. 1994). 
177. Gabriel v. Lovewell, 164 S.W.3d 835, 848 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (“The jurors were 
entitled to consider all this evidence in light of their own general experience and common sense 
and conclude that the Gabriels’ acts or omissions were a substantial factor in bringing about the 
injury.”); David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 
1347 (1992) (“[C]ourts simply leave to the jury, without further definition, the question of 
whether the conduct was a substantial factor.”). 
178. HON. PATRICK F. BRADY ET AL., MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL 
PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.1.8 (Mass. Continuing Legal Ed. 2d ed. 2003) (using the 
term “substantial” in its ordinary sense, which requires no further elaboration). 
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‘substantial factor’ is so clear as to need no expository definition”179 or 
that substantial factor causation “expresses a concept of relativity which 
is difficult to reduce to further definiteness.”180  Leaving the fact finder to 
determine whether the but for or sufficient cause in question is either 
significant or insignificant is consistent with the value our system places 
on the abilities of juries, and that any further definitional efforts may 
confound or impair understanding and application. 
Other courts have continued to use the definition and criteria used in 
the Second Restatement, which references that substantial means that the 
“defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead 
reasonable men to regard it as a cause.”181  Section 432 further explains 
the need to excuse defendants from liability for a but for or sufficient cause 
that is otherwise trivial when compared to the other applicable causes.  
That is, conduct is not a substantial factor when it “is so insignificant that 
no ordinary mind would think of [it] as [a] cause[].”182 
The case for the continued use of “substantial factor” resides largely 
in its familiarity, including its apparent acceptance and entrenchment in 
the “twin fire” scenario as well as toxic tort or asbestos cases.183  It is a 
term that has been used in causation parlance for over a century, including 
by a significant number of jurisdictions.184  Further, “substantial factor” 
works well in the “twin fire” or multiple sufficient cause scenario.  Where 
adequate instruction is given to the fact finder that there can be more than 
one cause, the concern that “substantial factor” can substitute and 
eliminate “but for,” or otherwise support the misconception that a single 
cause must be found, is significantly diminished.  “When it is carefully 
 
179. Pilon v. Alderman, 152 A. 157, 157 (Conn. 1930). 
180. Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 466 P.2d 605, 614 (Or. 1970). 
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a. (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
182. Id.  Further, courts have continued to use the criteria in section 433 of R2, which 
identifies: 
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the 
extent of the effect which they have in producing it; (b) whether the actor’s conduct 
has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and active operation 
up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation harmless unless acted upon 
by other forces for which the actor is not responsible; (c) lapse of time. 
Id. § 433.  Indeed, the Massachusetts Appeals Court has affirmed a trial court’s use of these 
factors in a causation instruction.  Mastaby v. Cent. Hosp., Inc., 613 N.E.2d 123, 124–25 & n.3 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
reporters’ note cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST. 2010); see also O’Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 518 
N.E.2d 510, 512–13 (Mass. 1988) (utilizing “substantial factor” in an asbestos injury claim). 
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 
reporters’ note cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST. 2010); see also O’Connor, 518 N.E.2d at 512–13. 
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applied, the version of the substantial-factor test laid out in [the Second 
Restatement, section 432(2)] does useful work in numerous cases,” with 
the issue remaining that the use “be confined by rigorous criteria.”185 
The complete banishment of “substantial factor” under the Third 
Restatement’s approach is problematic.  Replacing “substantial factor” 
with “contribute,” “sufficient,” or “necessary” does not obviate the 
evaluative problem perceived with “substantial factor.”  Assessment of 
whether a cause contributed or was sufficient or necessary requires an 
assessment of degree as well.  Also, the Third Restatement—unlike the 
Second Restatement—wrongly omits that a defendant’s conduct in a 
multiple cause case needs to “be alone sufficient and itself substantial.”186  
Moreover, consideration of the trivial or insubstantiality aspect in the 
proximate cause portion of the inquiry (i.e. scope of liability), instead of 
factual causation, does not fit well despite the Third Restatement’s 
contention that the trivial/insubstantiality rule is one “of fairness, 
equitable-loss distribution, and administrative cost.”187  A determination 
that conduct was only an insignificant contribution or cause can be argued 
not to be one of policy, but rather that no reasonable person would 
consider it a cause.  Further, it can be argued that the Second 
Restatement’s approach as to the work of “substantial factor”—that is, 
distinguishing between but for causes and thus providing a further and 
important limitation—is a valuable approach and one which 
Massachusetts appeals courts have essentially followed.  Finally, the 
concerns with the use of “substantial factor” can be addressed without 
complete banishment, starting with the recognition that it is not meant to 
replace but for causation in multiple defendant or multiple cause cases or 
otherwise eliminate the independently sufficient causal showing absent 
concurrence or concert. 
CONCLUSION 
Any actual or suggested demise of but for causation in multiple 
defendant or multiple cause actions is wrongful.  “Substantial factor” was 
never intended to substitute and supplant “but for” in all actions involving 
multiple defendants or multiple causes.  There remains a formidable 
argument that there can be no causation, in any tort case, where the but for 
 
185. Three Arguable Mistakes, supra note 28, at 1019. 
186. Id. at 1021 (emphasis omitted); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). 
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 36 
cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 2010). 
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test has not been satisfied.188  At the very least, “[r]equiring the plaintiff 
to prove cause in fact by the but-for test is almost always the right 
approach.”189  Indeed, the long-standing causative showing in 
Massachusetts is not only “but for,” but also “substantial factor”: a factor 
must first be a cause before it can be a substantial cause.190 
Upon close inspection, neither Corey, Matsuyama, nor O’Connor 
provide any basis for wholesale use of “substantial factor” in lieu of the 
but for test in any multiple defendant action.  To be sure, Corey represents 
one of the infrequent “corner,” multiple sufficient, or over-determined 
cases.  Yet, Corey, and other cases like it, when properly examined and 
understood, can be addressed through principled application of concerted 
action.  This allows for a unification of the multiple defendants for 
purposes of factual causation without the wholesale abandonment of but 
for causation.  This, in turn, remains the exception and requires rigorous 
discipline with both sufficiency and “concerted action,” a fundamental 
prerequisites for imposition of such “aggregate” liability. 
To the extent Corey embodies the notion of joint and several liability 
or concurrent negligence, neither are surrogates for proper causal 
showing.  The notion that a tortfeasor should not be absolved of 
culpability where the harm would have also occurred due to the 
negligence of another does not obviate the need to require the necessary 
causative showing as to each defendant.  The fundamental need to show 
“but for” or sufficiency as to each individual and with reference to the 
specific defendant’s conduct and the specific harm remains. 
As to both O’Connor and Matsuyama and their rote recitation that  
The “substantial contributing factor” test is useful in cases in which 
damage has multiple causes, including but not limited to cases with 
multiple tortfeasors in which it may be impossible to say for certain 
that any individual defendant’s conduct was a but-for cause of the 
harm, even though it can be shown that the defendants, in the 
aggregate, caused the harm, 191 
 
188. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 282 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“Any standard less than but-for, however, simply represents a decision to impose liability 
without causation.”); see also Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 452 (2014) 
(“[A]lternative causal tests [to but-for] are a kind of legal fiction or construct.  If the conduct of 
a wrongdoer is neither necessary nor sufficient to produce an outcome, that conduct cannot in a 
strict sense be said to have caused the outcome.”). 
189. Common Sense, supra note 15, at 1776. 
190. See Jorgensen v. Mass. Port Auth., 905 F.2d 515, 524 (1st Cir. 1990). 
191. Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 842 (Mass. 2008). 
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remains misleading.  Matsuyama, in fact, did not even involve multiple 
defendants, with the SJC otherwise acknowledging that the but for test 
applied to the facts before it and the asserted harm of a loss of chance of 
cure or better outcome.  Even if multiple defendants were present, absent 
concerted action and truly indivisible or identical statistical diminishment, 
each defendant’s liability and causative inquiry would need to be assessed 
independently. 
Finally, to the extent but for causation is problematic in cases such as 
O’Connor, it is because causation cannot be proved at the scientific 
level.192  It is not that the but for test has no application, but that “[t]he 
issue in such situations rather involves the manner and standard of proof 
that will satisfy, for legal as opposed to scientific purposes, the necessary 
element of causation, including its core component as expressed by the 
but for test.”193  As to the causal set, or NESS approach, identified in the 
comments of the Third Restatement, it is not remotely the law of 
Massachusetts or of most other jurisdictions.194  It imposes legal 
responsibility for individually insufficient, insubstantial, and unnecessary 
conduct.  Cause in fact requires the defendant’s conduct alone to be 
sufficient and itself substantial.195 
Absent compelling circumstances, every defendant, including in 
actions involving multiple defendants or multiple causes, is entitled to 
have their respective conduct individually assessed for purposes of 
causation.  They should not be subject to a diluted standard merely 
because there are multiple defendants or multiple causes.  While there may 
be more than one cause in fact, the dispositive and minimum showing 
remains “but for,” or whether the harm would have occurred absent the 
specific tortious conduct at issue.  To utilize “substantial factor” in all such 
cases or without reference to but for causation or sufficiency is 
inappropriate and results in the distinct potential of requiring either a 
heightened or lessened showing as to the necessary connection between 
the specific conduct and the specific harm fundamental to legal 
responsibility. 
 
192. O’Connor v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 510, 511–13 (Mass. 1988). 
193. David et al., supra note 30, at 220. 
194. But see Major v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 222 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 581–82 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2017). 
195. See Three Arguable Mistakes, supra note 28, at 1021–23 (arguing that the omission 
from § 27 of the Third Restatement that a defendant’s “conduct be alone sufficient and itself 
substantial” is a mistake). 
